The silent masters of the oceans: the strategic and non-proliferation implications of nuclear-powered submarines in Australia and Brazil
Abstract
At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference in 2022, Director General Rafael Grossi emphasizes that “the world of nuclear proliferation and safeguards is changing,” and that this change creates important technical and political challenges. The announcement of the AUKUS agreement and the progress of Brazil’s nuclear-powered submarine program reflect regional geopolitical realignments. Internationally, the IAEA safeguards system is challenged by these developments insofar as they entail risks of nuclear proliferation. How does the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines impact both the regional and international strategic balance and nuclear non-proliferation norms? The purpose of this research note is to analyze the geopolitical motivations of nuclear-powered submarine programs in Australia and Brazil and their impact on non-proliferation instruments.
About the Author
Douglas de Quadros Rocha is a doctoral researcher in the Strategy Department of the Magellan Laboratory (EA 3713, IAE, Lyon III) and head of the Nuclear Studies Unit at the Institute for Strategy and Defense Studies (IESD, Faculty of Law, Lyon III). He is a doctoral student in political science at the Université Jean Moulin Lyon-III, where he is writing a thesis on France's nuclear deterrence and arms control strategy. His research focuses on nuclear issues (deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament), French deterrence doctrine and strategic risk reduction.
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