Analysis of Russian Airpower in the 21st Century
Abstract
Russia intends on utilizing its airpower to conduct offensive power projection in neighboring countries and to defend itself from Western encroachment. This concept of airpower falls in line with Russia’s national objectives, which are to regain worldwide recognition as a great power, reclaim and secure Russia’s influence over former Soviet controlled nations, and to portray itself as a regional powerbroker in order to regain credibility so it can rewrite the liberal global order and counter US influence. Additionally, Russia is in the process of acquiring fifth-generation fighter aircraft and advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for reasons of supporting its military industrial complex and keeping pace technologically with its Western competitors. Despite acquisition of this advanced technology, trends in combat operations and training exercises suggest Russia will utilize these advanced platforms in traditional mission sets.
About the Author
John Gerlach is an associate researcher in international security and defense at the University of Lyon III, Jean Moulin School of Law, Lyon France. He graduated Syracuse University (2006), with a Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering and a Master of Social Sciences (2014). After graduating university, he was commissioned in the United States Air Force and received his pilot wings in 2008. He has completed multiple deployments in support contingency operations overseas piloting the C-17 Globemaster III aircraft. Prior to moving to France as part of the Olmsted Scholar program, he was an instructor at the United States Air Force Weapons School. Recently, John received his Master Degree in International Security and Defense (2019) from the University of Lyon III, Jean Moulin School of Law.
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