Carl von Clausewitz in his time: die Natur des Mannes
Abstract
The eight books of Vom Kriege (On War), written between 1820 and 1831 by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, have long inspired strategists and strategists, despite the incompleteness of the work and the often arduous philosophical criticism that structures the frame. Center of gravity, climax, defensive superiority or the notion of friction, to name but a few of the general Clausewitzian concepts, have been largely absorbed by the thought and doctrines of military forces around the world, from Moltke to Foch, from Lenin to Mao, from the US Marine Corps to contemporary irregular fighters of all persuasions. The price for this success, Clausewitz was of course criticized and sometimes misread, seeing himself accused of being responsible for the “Napoleonic” obsession for the direct frontal impact that will mark the First World War (B. Liddell Hart), of not no longer be really relevant for the analysis of the “new wars” of the post-Cold War era in which military victory is no longer enough (M. Kaldor, B. Heuser4), or to base its theory on a Trinitarian conception (Government , Army, People) too stato-centered to account for low intensity (“non-Trinitarian”) wars which would represent the future of conflictuality (M. Van Creveld5). These regular questioning (“The Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz”, to quote Christopher Bassford), paradoxically end in highlighting the centrality of the Prussian, who remains considered the greatest strategist in history.
About the Author
Oliver Zajec is Professor in Political Science at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University. He is the director of the IESD.
Clausewitz
Perrin, 2016
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