“Some other kinds of controlled general war”: What debate on the use of tactical nuclear weapons?
Abstract
When it was released in early February 2018, the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was described as a major breakthrough by a number of observers of the American strategic debate. Following the NPR’s paragraphs on tactical weapons, also known as “non-strategic” or “theater” weapons, U.S. military nuclear policy has shifted in this area, whether doctrinally, operationally, or capability-wise, prompting a significant number of endowed-or non-endowed-powers to rethink their own relationship to atomic weaponry. How can this paper be placed in the broader context of the return of theories of “limited” nuclear war? The purpose of this summary research note is to revisit this issue from a historical, operational and political perspective.
About the Author
Oliver Zajec is Professor in Political Science at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University. He is the director of the IESD.
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𝐉𝐚𝐧𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟑